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Abstract 
This paper proposes a new diagram for a specific matching problem: the stable marriage problem. The diagram allows us to elicit not only the 
structure of with a blocking relation among the nodes representing pairs, but also asymmetry in the actions of the DA algorithm (Gale-Shapley 
algorithm).  Symmetry and asymmetry of the stable marriage problems permit us to deduce strategies of whether or not and when proposals 
should be made. Some implications to the asymmetry in rewarding and penalty in the game theoretic model are also discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
Diagrams, when properly visualized, play an important role for humans with the most efficient information processing among 
the five senses: vision, auditory, touch, smell and taste. Diagrams have been studied for a long time not only in science but also 
for technology. To mention just a few, block diagrams for control engineers; railway diagrams for railway engineers, network 
diagrams for computer engineers and so on. The diagram proposed in this paper uses cues from a railway diagram (a train service 
planning diagram)6, 10. 
On the other hand, the stable marriage problem (SMP)3, 4, 7 has been studied extensively, and its process and strategic aspect of 
how particular stable matchings will be formed has been a topic of focus recently8. In order for a problem solver (a decision 
maker) to arrange an appropriate arrangement, not only structural knowledge but also process knowledge is required.  
Nomenclature 
N            the size of the SMP 
wjmiR ,  a rank of mi to wj, 1 when first preferred and N when last preferred 
wjP  a popularity of wj, N when most popular and N
2 when last popular  
a matching consisting of N pairs of man and woman {( mi, wj): i, j=1, …, N}
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This paper focuses on process knowledge expressed by a diagram. Usually, SMP assumes each agent knows only his (her) 
preference and not the other agent preferences. However, we assume that the problem solver knows all the preference and the 
global diagram expressed for the problem solver is visually available to the problem solver. 
We also have proposed several diagrams for computational problems; stable marriage problems in particular5. We will 
propose yet another diagram that can be used for the strategy of a decision maker. 
The motivation of this work is to provide a new diagram for matching problems to elicit the process aspect using the Gale-
Shapley algorithm; and deduce a strategy for decision making. Thus, seeking for asymmetric aspects of reward and penalty in the 
game theoretic model. These aspects may shed light on an education model for active learning, which tries to make actions from 
unidirectional to bidirectional between teachers and students. We will use the stable marriage problem (or a matching 
automaton8 ), as the well-known Gale-Shapley algorithm is available to focus on the process aspects. 
Section 2 briefly revisits the stable marriage problem and the Gale-Shapley algorithm. Section 3 proposes two diagrams for 
SMP focusing on the dynamic aspect comparing them with the existing diagrams that focuses on the static aspect. Section 4 
discusses strategies for each agent and policy for a decision maker based on these two diagrams. Section 5 discusses a possible 
application to an education model and to the formation of a mutual support agreement with local governments. 
2. Stable Marriage Problems as a Matching Problem 
Matching problems obtain matchings: a set of pairs within or between a set of discrete elements. For example, the roommate 
problem obtains the matching: a set of pairs of roommates; and the stable marriage problem obtains the matching: as a set of 
husband and wife between two sets: a set of females and a set of males.  
The stable roommate problem (SRP) assumes 2N participants, each of whom has a strict (without tie) ordered preference over 
the other 2N  1 participants. The SRP seeks complete matching consisting of N pairs without being blocked. A matching is said 
to be blocked if participant A prefers participant C to current roommate B in the matching, and preferred participant C also 
prefers participant A to current roommate D in the matching. The pair A-C is called a blocking pair to the matching.  
The stable marriage problem (SMP)5,6,9 assumes N women and N men, each of whom has a strict (without tie) ordered 
preference over the opposite sex. In a framework allowing an unmarried state, each person has a strict order of preference for 
members of the opposite sex and oneself.9 As seen in the next Example 1, man m2 has a ranking (w2, w1, w3), which means that 
m2 likes w2 best, and prefers w2 to w1 ; w3 to w1. 
The problem instances of the SMP can be depicted by many types of graph, however, the graph usually focuses on how the 
nodes are connected. Diagrams, e.g., railway diagram, can include the crossing point or even the orientation of the edge as 
important information for visual recognition. 
Example 1. (A diagram for SMP) 
Taking the basis of its structure from from the railway diagram, Fig. 1 shows a diagram indicating the blocking aspects in a 
manner similar to the train of the railway diagram. Table 1 shows a ranking matrix of an instance of 3 by 3 SMP and Fig. 1 right 
depicts a diagram similar to the railway diagram10. In the diagram, both women and men are placed in a line with the coordinate 
of popularity (global coordinate). At each point indicating a woman wi (a man mi), there is a local coordinate indicating how 
popular each man is for the woman wi (how popular each woman is for the man mi). 
By the diagram, it is known that even if a man is unpopular in a global coordinate, he can surpass a more popular man in 
success of proposal (reach the station earlier) if the target woman prefers the globally unpopular man to the popular man. The 
situation is expressed by the angle of the line (relative popularity), crossing of two lines (block the proposal) and length of line 
(success possibility of the proposal). Fig. 1 right shows that even if a proposal from m3 to w1, which has more success possibility 
than a proposal from m1 to w1, will be blocked by the proposal from m1 to w1.  
 
Table 1. Ranking matrix of SMP with three men and three women. 
 (a) Ranking of women by men; (b) Ranking of men by women.  
(a)                                                                       (b) 
w1 w2 w3 m1 m 2 m 3
m1 2 1 3  w1  3 1 
m2 2 1 3  w2 3 1 2 
m 3 1 3 2  w3 1 2 3 
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3. Diagrams for Matching Problems 
This section introduces several diagrams for matching problems, the stable marriage problem (SMP)5,6,9 in particular. The 
SMP assumes N women and N men, each of whom has a strict (without tie) ordered preference over the opposite sex. In a 
framework allowing an unmarried state, each person has a strict order of preference for members of the opposite sex and 
oneself.9 As seen in the next Example 2, man m2 has a ranking (w1, w2), which means that m2 likes w1 best, and prefers w1 to w2.  
The SMP seeks complete matching which satisfies stability. Stability requires the concept of blocking pairs. Two pairs (mi, 
wp) and (mj, wq) are blocked by the pair (mi, wq) if mi prefers wq to wp and wq prefers mi to mj. A complete matching without being 
blocked is called stable matching. In game theoretic terms, the pair (mi, wq) is said to be dominant over the pairs: (mi, wp) and (mj, 
wq).  
3.1.  Diagrams for static and structural aspect 
The N by N SMP has (N!)2N has combinatorically distinct instances (even with 3 female by 3 male there are 46,656 (3!)6). 
However, they can be reduced when labeling for female and labeling for male is neglected, and further to half of it when gender 
is further neglected. Essentially, the preference matrix can be visualized by a graph. For example, it can be expressed by a 
directed and weighted bi-partite graph; directed graph (called stable marriage graph), and so forth. Thus, we only need a smaller 
size of classes by the graph equivalence relation. 
Example 2. 
As an example of diagrams of a static and structural aspect, Fig. 2 (a) shows a reduced stable marriage graph of the same SMP 
instance specified by the ranking table of Table 1. In stable marriage graph, nodes at the row mi and column wj indicate a pair mi 
and wj; arcs indicate preference. In Fig. 2 (a), the arc from w3 to w1 in the row of m1 indicates that m1 prefers w1 to w3. In the 
reduced stable marriage graph, arcs corresponding to the preference deduced from other preferences are removed. 
Since SMP can be viewed as an automaton with preference as inputs and matching as outputs (called matching automaton), 
the state transition diagram can be drawn. Figure 2 (b) shows a state transition diagram drawn in the affinity space (called affinity 
space diagram). The affinity space diagram is similar to a phase space diagram which is often drawn for a continuous dynamical 
model. Affinity is used to measure the happiness of a person in a pair. A(mi, wj) is man mi’s affinity for woman wj, and A(wj, mi) 
is woman wj’s affinity for man mi. Let wjmiR , denote man mi’s rank of woman wj. Affinity is defined by the rank as: A(mi, wj) = N
+ 1  wjmiR , , varying from N to 1 as the rank changes from 1 to N. The following total happiness for women and men is used to 


















jim wmAP  









Fig. 1. A bipartite graph showing a matching between men and women (left); and a diagram with a 
popularity (right) indicating difficulty of the proposal by the length of the edge and blocking the 
proposal by other proposals by the crossing of two edges. 
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3.2.  Diagrams for dynamic and process aspect 
This section presents two diagrams for exploring the process aspect, or the strategic aspect of actions. One focusing on the 
hierarchical structure with a blocking relation (called blocking diagram). The Blocking Relation is a relation from a set of pairs 
to itself. A pair (mi, wq) has the blocking relation to (mj, wp) when two pairs (mi, wp) and (mj, wq) are blocked by the pair (mi, wq). 
Blocking arc is directed from the node of (mi, wq) to the node of (mj, wp). 
Definition 0. (Blocking Diagram) The Blocking Diagram is a graph (N, A) where N is a set of nodes representing N2 pairs 
and A is a set of blocking arcs directing from a blocking pair to the being blocked pair.  
 
The blocking diagram is further divided into two kinds of diagrams: a local strategic diagram (focusing on each agent’s 
strategic aspect) and a global strategic diagram (focusing on the decision maker’s strategic aspect). 
The popularity of the person is the sum of all the ranks of other persons to the person of interest. Thus, N is the smallest, 









ijm mRwP , where ji wRm , is the man mi’s ranking to the woman wj; and ji wRm , is the woman 
wj ’s ranking to the man mi 
Definition 1. (Local Strategic Diagram) The Strategic Diagram is a graph (N, A) equivalent with the graph of the blocking 
diagram above. The nodes are arranged on N-polygons. For SMP, we have two N-polygons: one for female and the other for 
male. As for the diagram for male, nodes of pairs with the most popular male are placed on the first edge (in a clockwise 
direction) with the order of the male’s preference, and the next popular male for the next edge and so forth. 
Definition 2. (Global Strategic Diagram) The Blocking Diagram is a graph (N, A) equivalent with the graph of the blocking 
diagram above. The nodes are arranged on a circle. With the reachability of the blocking arcs, the nodes are hierarchically 
ordered by the reachability. The node of the highest reachability is placed on the 12 o’clock positon of the circle, and other nodes 
are placed on the circle in a clockwise direction in the reachability descendent order. 
Example 3. 
Fig. 3 shows an example of the local strategic diagram of Table 2; and Fig. 4 shows an example of the global strategic 
diagram of Table 1. Since both the local strategic diagram and the global one are blocking diagrams, nodes represent pairs and 
arcs represent blocking relations. Thus, in both diagrams, the number of arcs indicates the difficulty of successful proposals. 
In the local strategic diagram (Fig. 3.), although nodes represent pairs, nodes are arranged on an edge of the triangle 
representing persons. Red node indicates a pair that can be included in a stable matching, while blue one is unstable. Arcs 
indicate the blocking relations among all the pairs. We can observe there is at least one stable node in each edge of the triangle. 
Also, it is noted that nodes on the edge of a more popular person tend to be stable. It can be observed that if a person is more 
popular, then there are more outgoing arcs from the nodes on the edge of that person. Additionally,  a proposal from a popular 
person to an unpopular person will be more successful compared with the opposite case. 
Figure 3 left is the diagram based on the coordinate of popularity of a man, and right by the popularity of a woman. 
Three edges of the triangle are used for the global coordinate. Since the popularity of men is the following order: m3 (3); m2 
(7); m1 (8), pairs including m3 is on the right edge; m2 on the bottom edge; m1 on the left edge of the triangle. Within each edge, 














Fig. 2. A reduced stable marriage graph (left) and an affinity space diagram (right), where in the 
balloon a bipartite graph is shown. The stable marriage graph indicate the structure of the stable 
matchings; and the affinity space diagram shows the state transition among all the matchings indicated 
by dots: red dot stable matching and blue ones unstable. 
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w1), (m3-w2), (m3-w3), respectively) cannot be ranked based on the preference from woman, hence they are arranged based on the 
preference to the woman: (m3-w3), (m3-w2), (m3-w1). For the second popular m2, although the ranking from w1 and w2 is 2, m2 
prefers w1 to w2, hence the three nodes on the bottom are arranged by the order: (m2-w1), (m2-w2), (m2-w3). Likewise, on the left 
edge, three nodes are arranged by the order: (m1-w3), (m1-w2), (m1-w1). 
Since we know that the higher the out-degree (in-degree) of the node is the more likely the node blocks (being blocked). Thus, 
the cluster of nodes based on the reachability play an important role in determining the stability of the pair. Fig. 4 shows the 
global strategic diagram for the SMP instance specified by Table 1 where nodes are arranged on a circle by the order of 
reachability from the highest at 12 o’clock to the lowest at 11 o’clock in a clockwise direction. 
The circle diagram can be viewed as showing a process of a matching formation. That is, in Fig. 4 left, first (m2-w1) is coupled 
supressing the couples blocked by this node, then the next highest (m2-w2) is coupled, and at last the remaining (m2-w3) is 
coupled. On the other hand, in Fig. 4 right, first either two couples  (m1-w2), (m3-w3) or two couples (m1-w3), (m3-w2) are formed, 
then the remaining  (m2-w1) will be coupled. 
 
 Table 2. Ranking matrix of SMP with three men and three women. 
 (a) Ranking of women by men; (b) Ranking of men by women.  
(a)                                                                       (b) 
w1 w2 w3 m1 m 2 m 3
m1 3 2 1  w1 3 2 1 
m2 2 3 1  w2 3 2 1 
m 3 3 2 1  w3 2 3 1 
  
Fig. 4. Global strategic diagram. Although nodes represent pairs, nodes are arranged on a circle by the 
order of reachability from the highest at 12 o’clock to the lowest at 11 o’clock to the clockwise 
direction. Red node indicates the pair that can be included in a stable matching, while blue one is 
unstable. Arcs indicate blocking relation among all the pairs.㻌
1-3
Fig. 3. Local strategic diagram by the man’s popularity left and by the woman’s popularity right. 
Although nodes represent pairs, nodes are arranged on an edge of the triangle representing persons. 
Red node indicates the pair that can be included in a stable matching, while blue one is unstable. Arcs 
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Lemma 1. 
If two nodes form a circuit of length two in a blocking diagram, then the two pairs corresponding to the two nodes appear as a 
stable matching. 
Proof
When the two nodes corresponding to the pairs (mi, wi) and (mj, wj) form a cycle, then we have: 
R mi, wi < R mi, wj; 
R wi, mi < R wi, mj; 
R mj, wi < R mj, wi; 
R wj, mj < R wj, mi; 
This means that the pairs (mi, wi) and (mj, wj) always block the matching that includes unstable pairs  (mi, wj) and (mj, wi). 
 
Thus, this is the generalized situation of the both rank the partner first: 
R mi, wi = R wi, mi =1; 
R mj, wj = R wj, mj =1; 
Thus, the two pairs (mi, wi) and (mj, wj) would appear instead of  (mi, wj) and (mj, wi) in a stable matching of the solution. This 
means that when there are only two men and two women, and if they form a circuit, then the couples corresponding to the nodes 
of the circuit always are stable matching, and also the two couples are the only stable matching of the SMP.  
 




If k (=2, …, N) nodes form a simple circuit (with just the k arcs of the same direction, hence a circuit) of length k in a blocking 
diagram of a k by k  SMP, then the k pairs  {( mi, wi): i =1, …, k} corresponding to the k nodes appear as a stable matching. 
Proof
When the k nodes corresponding to the pairs (m1, w1) and (mk, wk) form a circuit, then we have: 
R m1, w1 < R m1, w2; 
R w1, m1 < R w1, m2; 
R m2, w2 < R m2, w3; 
R w2, m2 < R w2, m3; 
… 
R mk, wk < R mk, w1; 
R wk, mk < R wk, m1; 
 
This situation is the case that no one is to blame for the matching: ȣ= {(m1, w1), (m2, w2),…, (mk, wk) }.  
It is noted that for 3 by 3 SMP (when k=3 in the Theorem 1), a simple cycle (3 arcs can be any direction) suffices the 
condition of Theorem 1 (Example 4 below). 
The Lemma 1 also suggests a decomposition of the pair, i.e. the pair corresponding to the nodes forming a circuit in a diagram 
is an indecomposable component similar to the pair of the two persons ranking first each other. In other words, such a circuit will 
not appear in a diagram of indecomposable SMP. 
 
Theorem 2. 
If k (=2, …, N) nodes form a connected component with any node is reachable from any other node in a blocking diagram of a 
N by N  SMP and the component is the highest rank with respect to the reachability, then the component is indecomposable. 
Example 4. 
Fig. 5 shows situations of the nodes in a cycle. The strategic blocking diagram on the left has a circuit of length three (left) : 
(m1,w1) (m2,w2) (m3,w3) , hence the matching {(m1,w1),  (m2,w2),  (m3,w3)} is stable matching (Theorem1). However, the strategic 
blocking diagram on the right does not have such a circuit. However, for the 3 by 3 SMP, even with the cycle of length three, it 
will have such stable matching.  It is also noted that the pairs (m1,w2),  (m2,w3),  (m3,w1); (m1,w3),  (m2,w1),  (m3,w2) will not 
appear in any of the stable matching. 
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As for an implication to the strategic knowledge for a person to increase the success rate of a proposal (to marry), the best one 
is to propose to a person who likes the proposer best. However, the proposer’s preference is not always consistent with the 
preference of the person being proposed. The best case is where both prefer each other best. The second best case may be the 
proposal within the pair of the generalized case above. There can be many strategies for a problem solver and for each agent to 
make their decision as discussed in the next section. The diagram with a circle coordinate (where each pair node is arranged by 
reachability hierarchy) is for a problem solver (Sect. 4.2) and the diagram with a polygon coordinate (where each pair node is 
arranged by a person’s popularity) is for each agent (Sect. 4.1). 
4. Symmetry and Asymmetry in Stable Marriage Problems 
4.1. Symmetry in the actions of Gale-Shapley Algorithm 
Symmetry is defined by operations on the target objects and indistinguishability. To discuss symmetry in the SMP, we need to 
set a unit for the components of the SMP. SMP as a combinatorial problem has several symmetries such as a male-female 
exchange symmetry (male and female is a matter of labeling, that is, the structure of the stable matching solutions is invariant 
under the exchange of male and female.).  
The Gale-Shapley algorithm (GS-algorithm)3, 4, 7, also known as the Deferred Acceptance algorithm, is a natural algorithm 
that defines one gender (say male) as the proposing side  and a member of the opposite gender (female) waits for the proposal, 
where they can defer acceptance for as long as they like. While SMP has at least two solutions (that can be identical): man-
optimal (woman-pessimal) and woman-optimal (man-pessimal), the man-optimal solution (the woman-optimal solution) can be 
obtained only when the men (the women) are on the proposal side. Thus, the actions of proposal exhibit symmetry with respect 
to proposal actions. That is, the X-optimal solution is obtained when the proposal side is X. 
 
In the previous section we suggested a decomposition induced by a restricted set (a connected component with respect to 
reachability in the blocking diagram). Indeed, if we restrict all the agents to only a set of men (women), we have the man-
oriented decomposition (woman-oriented decomposition).   
 
Corollary 1.Man-oriented decomposition 
If the decomposition of Theorem 2 is in a strategic diagram where only the man’s preference is expressed, then the 
decomposition is a man-oriented decomposition that can apply only man-optimal matching of the SMP. 
In order to solve the problem, the problem should generally be operated in a sequential fashion, which is one directional and 
asymmetric (as opposed to both directional as symmetric). Thus, we need to introduce asymmetry in the algorithm and the 
asymmetry may be preserved in the solution. In the case of the SMP, the Gale-Sharpley algorithm requires the proposing side to 
be set, and the resulting solution is optimal for that side.  
If the man-optimal solutions are decomposed, then we can decompose the original problem into multiple non-decomposable 
components restricted to men (called “man-decomposition”), if we are interested only in the man-optimal solutions. The 
decomposition condition proposed by Veklerov9, can be viewed as man-decomposition. This generalized decomposition is also 
related to the sequential decomposition5, which in turn relates to the strategy of each agent (or policy for a subset of agents or a 
single decision maker as in the next subsection). 
Fig. 5. The strategic blocking diagram with a circuit of length three (left) and that without the circuit 
(right). Both diagrams have a cycle of length three.㻌
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Example 5. (Asymmetry for Men/Women’s Strategies) 
Fig. 3 shows that even for the same instance, the local strategic diagram for men (Fig. 3 left) differs from that for women (Fig. 
3 right). Although the number of arcs are the same (i.e., 8), the diagram for women looks more complicated with more crossing 
points. Thus, for men, proposal should be encouraged, while for women proposal should be only when the proposing woman is 
popular.  
 
The polygon diagram where the pair node is ordered by the popularity (Sect. 3.2) may be used to induce strategy for each man 
and each woman. 
 
Example 6. (Strategy for Each Men/Women) 
Using the Fig. 3 of the Example 3 again, it is obvious that m3 should propose to w3 or vice versa from the diagram. (It is also 
clear from the Table 1, for they mutually like each other best.) Similarly, m1 should propose to w1 or vice versa. It is obvious 
even from the ranking matrix (Table 1) that m3 should propose to w3 or vice versa. However, it can be obvious from the diagram 
(Fig. 3) that  m1 should propose to w1 or vice versa, for they rank last mutually. 
4.2. Symmetry in the decision making 
The SMP of a chain described in Theorem 1 is a symmetric SMP (called a chain SMP). There are several symmetric SMPs. 
The Latin SMP2,3 describes a strange world where the more one person likes another person, then the more that other person 
dislikes the person (i.e., wjmiR , + miwjR ,  = N + 1 for all mi Ѱ M and wj Ѱ W).  
The pseudo-Latin SMP is defined to have a ranking such that the sum wjmiR , + miwjR , is no longer N + 1, although the elements 
must be distinct.3 For distinct men mi and ml, it is possible that wjmlwjmi RR ,,   and likewise for two distinct women. It is a 
challenge to study how many chain SMP’s exist, and if there is a chain Latin SMP. However, we will use them to undertake 
study on decision making. 
 
Example 7. (Strategy for Symmetric SMP) 
There are four types of 4 by 4 Latin SMP’s based on the structure of stable matchings: 4 stable matchings; 6 stable matchings; 
8 stable matchings and 10 stable matchings (called class 4, 6, 8 and 10 respectively). The polygon diagram where the pair node is 
ordered by the popularity (Sect. 3.2) may be used to induce strategy for each man and each woman. However, in the Latin SMP, 
persons cannot be distinguished by the preference structure (Fig. 6). Thus, the global strategic diagrams will be used. Fig. 1 
shows the global strategic diagrams for the four types of 4 by 4 Latin SMP. 
 
Example 8.  (Decision Making for Symmetric SMP) 
Fig. 7 shows the global strategic diagrams for the four types of 4 by 4 Latin SMP. It is noted that the diagram of class 4 has 
two circuits of length 4: (m1, w2); (m2, w3); (m3, w4); (m4, w1) and (m1, w3); (m2, w4); (m3, w1); (m4, w2), the SMP has these two 
matchings as stable ones (Theorem 1). Also, by the symmetry the SMP has two more stable ones: (m1, w1); (m2, w2); (m3, w3); 
(m4, w4) and (m1, w4); (m2, w1); (m3, w2); (m4, w3). For the diagram of class 6, there are four circuits of length 2: (m1, w2), (m4, w3); 
(m1, w3), (m4, w2); (m2, w4), (m3, w1); (m2, w1), (m3, w4). By these combinations, it is noted that persons are divided into two 
components: {{m1, m4,}, {w2, w3}}; {{m2, m3,}, {w1, w4}} and the SMP restricted on the subset of persons will be decomposed 
into two independent SMPs (Corollary 1). 
Fig. 6. Local strategic diagrams for the 4 by 4 Latin SMP of the class 6 
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5. Discussions for Applications  
5.1. An example of classroom assignment of questions to students 
Matching problems, when viewed as a matching automaton5 (where preference as input and stable matching as an output), can 
be used in the design of many tasks where a huge degree of freedom is available. While matching between schools and students 
has been studied from a strategic viewpoint8, assignment of questions to students in a classroom is such a task. From the 
viewpoint of active learning, an interactive way of classroom management is required for the teacher.  
When there are two sets: students and questions, assignment of questions to students can be viewed as a matching problem. 
Assuming that both the preference of students to questions and the preference of problems to students (from the viewpoint of a 
teacher) are available, the teacher (a decision maker) needs to decide not only the assignment but also the order of questions. An 
assignment based on the students’ preference can be rewarding to the students but may not be satisfactory to the teacher from the 
viewpoint of education. On the other hand, an assignment based on the teacher’s preference can be a penalty to the students. 
If the diagram proposed in this paper is available, the teacher can assign questions in a more detailed fashion: which question 
is to be asked to which students in what order considering that the assignment can be either a reward or penalty to the student. 
5.2. An example of formation of mutual support agreements among local governments 
Another area for applying and implementing this matching in society may be in the area of disaster reduction. We have 
already reported how the matching automaton can be used to design an evacuation scheme for a local government5.  Yet another 
area for applying the matching based design is in political management for building an appropriate formation of mutual support 
agreements among local governments. It has been noted that cooperation among local governments play an important role 
particularly in a large-scale disaster such as the Kobe earthquake in 1995 and the Shichuan earthquake in 2008. We have studied 
that a matching based design can explain the formation of local governments after the Tohoku earthquake in 2011, which implies 
that political management to support the formation of a mutual agreement amongst close local government is important for 
disaster reduction. For those tasks, the diagrams proposed here would be useful. For disaster reduction, the diagrams may be used 
Fig. 7. Global strategic diagrams for the four types of 4 by 4 Latin SMP: class 4 (top left); class 6 (top 
right); class 8 (bottom left); and class 10 (bottom right)
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to match between the required goods and supported goods in a dynamic fashion, for we have experienced that what is needed in 
each shelter, and what is supported, changes dynamically. 
6. Conclusions 
Two diagrams using cues from the railway diagram have been proposed. The asymmetry of actions in the Gale-Shapley 
algorithm for the stable marriage problem has been discussed. It is demonstrated that the two diagrams depicted on nodes 
expressing pairs can indicate asymmetry in the actions for each agent. Each agent can use the global knowledge expressed in the 
diagrams in their decision making when the global knowledge is available to each agent.  
It is also pointed out that when each agent is a person (human), then they can use the most effective human sense for visual 
information processing with the diagrams in their decision making, as done in the field of railway scheduling engineering.   
Although we focused on the stable marriage problem, (for one can easily imagine humans as agents) there is no doubt that the 
asymmetry analysis can also be effective for other matching problems (such as roommate problems) and assignment problems.  
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